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One surprising truth about hypocrisy is its irrelevance: the fact that someone is a 
hypocrite does not mean that his or her position on an issue is false. Environmentalists 
who litter do not by doing so disprove the claims of environmentalism. Politicians who 
publicly oppose illegal immigration but privately employ illegal immigrants do not 
thereby prove that contesting illegal immigration is wrong.  
 
 - Scott F. Aikin and Robert B. Talisse, “Perspectives: The Truth About Hypocrisy,”  
   Scientific American Mind 19, 6 (December 2008)  
 
 
I’m a non-practicing vegetarian. 
 




 La Rochefoucauld has a succinctly cynical one-liner on hypocrisy.  He called it “a 
tribute vice pays to virtue.”  I wonder if it might not be equally fair to call hypocrisy the 
tribute virtue extracts from vice. 
 
 
 To be a hypocrite requires you to understand, respect, perhaps even to esteem, virtue.  A 
hypocrite’s moral opinions and ethical principles might well be irreproachable—or why 
the “tribute”?  What’s lacking is the practical application of those values, and the most 
likely cause is a fault of character.  A person’s character might be revealed in a single 
crisis; however, it is more usually, and reliably, determined by habitual 
choices.  Aristotle called practical virtue a “state of character.”  He disagreed with his 
teacher’s view that to know the good is to do it so that all evil-doing is a form of 
ignorance.  Like most of us, Aristotle was probably acquainted with people who knew 
the good but neglected to do it, who knew the bad but did it anyway.  Aristotle defines 
humans as “rational animals”; that is, we have a non-rational in addition to a rational 
side to our nature.  Like Plato, he sees a rational grasp of the good as necessary for a 
decent, fulfilled life but disagrees that knowing what’s right is sufficient to compel us to 
choose it.  We also have to want to do it.  For Aristotle, this desire has no rational basis; 
it is instilled early in life by a sound upbringing with reward for good choices and 
punishment for bad ones. 
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 If a hypocrite has a deficient character, and character is revealed by habitual choices, 
then should we call that person a hypocrite who violates his or her principles only once, 
in a moment of weakness, say, or out of extreme necessity?   
 
 
 All hypocrisy is not the same.  Wright’s “non-practicing vegetarian” is comical, the butt 
of his own joke.  So was Mark Twain when he quipped that giving up smoking is easy 
because he’d done it thousands of times.  The meat-eating and cigar-smoking harm 
mostly themselves, which is why they can be funny.  A Congressperson who votes to 
restrict abortion but arranges for his teenage daughter or mistress to terminate a 
pregnancy is not comical but deplorable.  The same goes for the autocrat who publicly 
praises press freedom but contrives the assassination of investigative journalists.  The 
kind of hypocrite who wants to impose on others values which he or she routinely 
violates seems to me vitally different from the anti-tobacco smoker and non-practicing 
vegetarian.  At one end of the spectrum of hypocrisy are the one-off violator (Jean 
Valjean and that loaf of bread) and the hypocrite who hurts only him or herself (“If I 
cannot smoke in heaven, then I shall not go,” said Twain).  At the other end are the self-
aggrandizing public liar and the two-faced policymaker.   
 
 
 Hypocrisy is always a bad thing; yet the private is less despicable than the public 
variety.  Private hypocrisy is for the most part an individual fault.  Public hypocrisy is 
usually institutionalized.  The old double standard is one example, fading now in the 
more progressive strata of the more enlightened societies.  But, like all public hypocrisy, 
the idea that all grooms should arrive at the bar of marriage experienced and all brides 
virgins had bad, demoralizing consequences.  It created a demand, a nasty market trading 
in the abuse of women and girls paid to furnish the experience.  A tax system that makes 
low-wage workers without lawyers or lobbyists pay more than multinational 
corporations with plenty of both is another instance.  Then there’s the hypocrisy of the 
Founding Fathers who swallowed the obvious hypocrisy of slavery.  Even even the 
bloody Civil War didn’t bring the country fully to realize its founding ideals.  Then there 
is the hypocrisy of Realpolitik.  The year that World War II began in Europe, FDR is 
supposed to have said of the Nicaraguan dictator, “Somoza may be a son of a bitch, but 
he's our son of a bitch.”  A foreign policy is hypocritical when it condemns authoritarian 
regimes hostile to U. S. interests but embraces, and even arms, accommodating 
despots.  The list goes on:  priests who make little children suffer, police who neither 
protect nor serve, draft dodgers who grow up to be warmongers, the environmental 
crusader who drives a land yacht.  And so on.   
 
•          •          • 
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-I like living in the suburbs, but I don’t approve of them. 
-I think I understand. 
-You do? 
-Sure.  My favorite thing to eat is roast beef.  But do I approve of the methane from the 
cattle, the clear-cut forests, the revolting feedlots and slaughterhouses, the reckless 
sowing of antibiotics?  I can add the brutal treatment of my fellow mammals and the 
medically-proven damage to my own health. 
-So, we’re both hypocrites, then?  You, dietetically; me, sociologically? 
-Exactly. 
-Makes you want to blush for shame. 
-Yes.  We should blush.  But maybe, sometimes, that reddening is really the bloom on 
the cheek of civilization. 
-What? 
-Well, we’re all sinners.  The blush of shame and the glow of pleasure can look a lot 
alike.  Hypocrisy could be self-serving duplicity, but it can also be a way of blowing off 
steam, a relief from the discontents of civilization.  Sometimes.  You know, a Bronx 
cheer at the Superego? 
-Okay, Dr. Freud, here’s a question for you.  Do you think there’s any credit to be had in 
supporting values or principles you fully intend to violate? 
-To me, that’s not a rhetorical question, but an intriguing one.  My first reaction is that 
there may indeed be something like what you call “credit” in holding views you can 
defend, even if you violate them.  At least you might get some mitigation of guilt, 
shame, or whatever you feel about living in a suburb and I feel after scarfing prime rib 
until my ears ring.  I don’t know why exactly; but, somehow, it does make me feel just a 
wee bit less bad knowing that I know what I’ve done is wrong. 
-I don’t see how that lets us off the hook, even a little.  In fact, I think that’s just the 
problem. 
-How? 
-These feelings of regret or self-criticism are wedges that could pry open our consciences 
and so they give some promise that, eventually, we’ll make our behavior conform with 
our beliefs.  And yet. . . 
-And yet? 
-And yet guilt and remorse are forms of self-punishment, not reformation.  And, if they 
don’t result in a change of behavior, they’re pointless, aren’t they?  No more than a kind 
of ethical masochism. 
-Maybe that’s just what virtue requires, ethical masochism.  If our conscience didn’t 
punish us the way our parents once did how could we ever be good?  Guilt and remorse 
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make you displeased with yourself.  They’re the emotional accompaniment of knowing 
you’re in the wrong. 
-So what? 
-Well, wouldn’t you say that a criminal who knows he’s a criminal is better than one 
who doesn’t? 
-It’s a distinction, I’ll grant you, but not one that’s going to matter to the victim. 
-Fair enough.  It might help the criminal, though.  Last week, I read about a judge who 
gave a rapist a longer sentence than he might have because he hadn’t expressed remorse. 
-What if the rapist gave a fake apology? 
-Well, judges judge, and this judge would have had to judge the rapist’s sincerity. 
-That begs the question.  For instance, I’ll allow that you regret wolfing down your 
prime rib, but how significant is that regret when you’re already looking forward to next 
week’s roast—which I bet you are, aren’t you? 
-I confess I am.  So, you think sincerity’s a high virtue? 
-Pretty high, especially since what we’re talking about is hypocrisy. 
-But sincerity’s not much of a virtue in itself, is it? 
-How do you mean? 
-A sincere neo-Nazi isn’t superior to some fool who dresses up like one for 
Halloween.  No, sincerity’s a virtue only if it’s tied to some other virtue.  Empathy, for 
instance, or respect for the rights of others. 
-So, you’d say good people can be ironic, then, even sarcastic?  I mean, if a good person 
can be insincerely bad, why not the opposite?  Like the rapist pretending to be sorry. 
-Good point.  But. . . 
-But? 
-Well, it makes me wonder.  Can a good person be insincerely good—ironically 
good?  I’d say the irony can’t be about goodness, only their attitude toward it, or their 
way of expressing it.  Good people usually know how not good they are. 
-I’m not sure I follow you.  Can you give me an example? 
-Well, maybe Socrates.  For instance, he knows going into the conversation with that 
pagan fundamentalist Euthyphro that justice is a broader concept than piety.  He’s all for 
separating temple and state.  Maybe that’s why they killed him.  Did they make you read 
Euthyphro in college? 
-High school, actually.  I sort of remember it.  Socrates ties this earnest kid up like a 
pretzel asking him to define something that never gets defined. 
-That’s the one.  Piety’s what doesn’t get defined.  But that’s beside the point.   
-What is? 
-Piety.  The point is that Socrates pretends he doesn’t know anything while Euthyphro 
claims to know everything.  So, Socrates asks Euthyphro to teach him, and the kid’s so 
overconfident that he doesn’t pick up on Socrates’ irony, his insincerity.  Socrates must 
be three times Euthyphro’s age but he tells the kid that he’s as much wiser as he is 
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younger.  That’s a laugher but Euthyphro doesn’t get it.  He assumes Socrates is 
sincerely praising him.  But, by pretending ignorance, Socrates gets to use his Method 
and brings Euthyphro to admit a proposition that demolishes his original position of 
putting religion above ethics, that it’s better to be guided by myths than reason. 
-Whew.  That was pretty long-winded, Professor.  However, I don’t see that it proves 
anything.  The way I remember it, Euthyphro’s trying to do the right thing—he’s in a 
crisis of some kind, about a murder, I think—while Socrates is just playing mind 
games.  The kid’s in a moral crisis and the Father of Western Ethics never addresses 
it.  Just like he didn’t show up in the Assembly when they were discussing whether to 
commit mass murder.  Isn’t that a kind of hypocrisy? 
-Point taken.  But all I was trying to say is that Socrates is insincere and also good. 
-You’re sure he’s good?  A lot of Athenians didn’t think so, and they weren’t a bunch of 
morons.  Maybe they thought his famous claim of ignorance wasn’t a case of virtuous 
insincerity but an ego-trip and a way of making everybody else look dumb.  As you said, 
the claim of ignorance is what lets him ask his devastating, aggressive little questions. 
-Yet those little questions did show up the Athenians who were foolish—at least the ones 
who claimed to know everything, like Euthyphro. 
-When I read Euthyphro, I thought the title character was a perfect stooge made up by 
Plato just to show what his teacher could do.  The whole thing’s too perfect and, anyway, 
Plato wouldn’t have been there to take notes. 
-Point taken.  But my point is that Socrates didn’t confuse goodness with sincerity. 
-Because, in your opinion, he was good without being sincere? 
-Exactly. 
-But I still think he was a bit of a hypocrite. 
-I don’t see how. 
-Didn’t he ridicule Athens’ democracy? 
-Sometimes, when it deserved it. 
-Maybe it did deserve it sometimes, but he also praised Sparta. 
-And yet he fought bravely for Athens against Sparta.  And that was the only time he 
ever left the city. 
-Did he fight with irony?   
-Fight with irony? 
-Well, it is kind of ironic, isn’t it, that he’d defend Athens against Sparta and call Sparta 
the better place.  Sparta had no interesting food, a madly military culture; most of the 
people in it were slaves, on top of which Sparta had a law against philosophers. 
-Socrates knew all that, of course.  I don’t take his praise of Sparta at face value.  I don’t 
think it was either sincere or hypocritical.  It was just ironic.  It’s as if he meant to say, 
“Compared to you money-grubbing, imperialistic, mob-minded Athenians, even Sparta 
looks good.”  No, Socrates was the best of Athenians.  What good is a democracy 
without gadflies and dissidents? 
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-Yet his students overthrew the state three times in ten years, didn’t they?  They 
murdered a lot of people and revoked people’s rights.  And his top student despised 
democracy.  He left it for a dozen years and, when he came back, he wrote The 
Republic—which, by the way, they did make me read in college.  And what is that utopia 
except the anti-Athens? 
-We’re digressing. 
-I think we’ve been doing that for a while 
 
•         •         • 
 
 There’s a distinction between private hypocrisy that doesn’t involve others and the 
public variety that does.  There’s also one between hypocrites who know they’re 
hypocrites and those who don’t.  It’s not easy to decide which is worse. 
 
 
 In the conscious hypocrites’ favor is that at least they aren’t sleepwalkers.  Carnivores 
who are philosophically, ethically, ecologically, and spiritually vegetarians hae the 
potential of one day living up to their beliefs, turning down the hamburger and ordering 
the veggie burger.  The same can’t be said of the unconscious hypocrite, such as a Bible-
thumping, adulterous, graft-taking, racist lawmaker who qualifies as what Twain called 
“a good Christian in the worst sense.”  Unaware of any hypocrisy, quick to rationalize 
(the affair was a romance, the graft a contribution, it wasn’t racism but sound social 
policy justified by the Good Book), such people are apt to believe themselves more, not 
less, virtuous than others.  On the other hand, the oblivious hypocrite has a kind of 
innocence, though it’s exasperating.  
 
 Hypocrites aware of their hypocrisy bear greater responsibility for violating values of 
which they approve.  But it is this consciousness that makes them more likely to 
reform.  If they don’t mend their ways, it’s down to weak character, not poor or absent 
reasoning.  Yet even a wholly naive, unconscious hypocrite might experience a 
shattering moment of self-awareness, an epiphany provoking instant change for the 
better.  Their character remains the same because they always thought they were 
pursuing virtue; they just didn’t know what it was. 
 
 In short, a weak character can be reformed.  Ignorance is curable.  But a thoroughly 
stupid hypocrite, somebody like Tom Buchanan in The Great Gatsby, is immovable. 
 
•         •         • 
 
-Nobody’s born a hypocrite. 
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-Nope.  Agreed.   
-Would you say that hypocrites once had integrity then lost it? 
-Some, maybe. 
-And the others? 
-Well, some of them too, I suppose, the kind that take their hypocrisy in with mother’s 
milk, before they’ve had time to develop anything like integrity.  They’re reared to 
hypocrisy, so to speak. As Oscar Hammerstein put it, “you have to be carefully taught.” 
-And the ones who lose their integrity? 
-That happens, sure.  In fact, would you care for an obscure example? 
-Fire away. 
-Guillaume de Wendeval wanted to go off to fight under his king, like everyone else.  He 
was a noble, though he owned no land, nothing but his horse and his arms.  He dreamed 
of the crusader’s glory on earth and reward in Heaven.  He was a pious man who took 
mass regularly, contributed what he could to the Church, and loved his 
sovereign.  Unfortunately, just a week before the army was to take ship, he fell from his 
horse and broke a leg.  With everybody who counted gone to the wars, there was a 
shortage of nobles to run things at home.  And so, faute de mieux, de Wendeval was 
assigned a high position in his shire.  The bitterness of his disappointment was offset by 
the conviction that he could still serve God and his sovereign by doing the will of the 
regent and seeing to the well-being of his people.  He took up his work with 
determination and resolved to act firmly but fairly, with concern for the common 
welfare.  When the news arrived that the king had been captured and was being held for 
ransom, he dedicated himself to raising everything he could from the people.  It was hard 
work and made him unpopular.  But, convinced of the justice of his efforts, and 
provoked by the grumbling of the people, he grew ever more ruthless.  In view of the 
difficulties, he felt he was entitled to a portion of what he extracted.  If, he reasoned, he 
was the agent of the regent and the regent represented the king and the king was God’s 
lieutenant on earth, then he shouldn’t have to live like some base yeoman.  By virtue of 
the dignity of his position, he merited land, which he confiscated from those unable to 
pay their taxes and money from those who could.  Nor should he go on living as a 
bachelor, with his manhood mocked by every butcher and tinker.  Wasn’t marriage as 
much a sacrament as the Eucharist?  A wife was his due, a high-born one, just as it was 
his duty to arrest the deer-poaching rabble who made their home in the forest.  He 
instructed his men-at-arms that they were doing God’s work and, lame as he was, he 
would carry out the duties of his office scrupulously and with rigor, and so should they. 
-I think I can guess, but what was this Guillaume’s office? 
-For the term of Richard the Lionheart’s captivity, Guillaume de Wendeval was High 
Sheriff of Nottingham. 
 
•          •           • 
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 Hypocrisy is a species of inconsistency.  It has to be considered in relation to time; that 
is, it matters when the inconsistency occurs. 
 
 
 People who change their views over time are liable to be accused of hypocrisy by their 
rivals, especially if they are eminent ones.  
 
 For a long time, Lincoln thought sending slaves to Africa was the answer to the 
country’s running sore.  Henry Clay and Thomas Jefferson favored that policy, too.  As 
late as 1858, in one of his debates with Stephen Douglas, Lincoln was saying: “I am not, 
never have been, nor ever will be in favor of bringing about in any way the social and 
political equality of the white and black races.” In 1862, he was still entertaining a plan 
to exile all blacks—both free and enslaved, presumably—this time to Central 
America.  It’s “better for us both. . . to be separated,” he argued before the blowback 
came.  He dropped that plan once he issued the Emancipation Proclamation.  Still, we 




 Was Lincoln a hypocrite because he was inconsistent?  Surely, we’ll prefer to say his 
thinking “evolved,” and in the right direction, too; and, if he hadn’t been assassinated, 
might have continued along the same admirable trajectory.  Inconsistency over time is 
not necessarily hypocrisy; in fact, it seldom is. In other words, while all hypocrisy is 
inconsistency, not all inconsistency is hypocrisy. 
 
 
 The charge is more justly reserved for those who profess views while simultaneously 
betraying them.  There’s peace-preaching John Lennon supporting the IRA, Libertarians 
who oppose Social Security, welfare, and public education while jealously guarding their 
businesses’ tax breaks.  Lincoln’s inconsistency on slavery reveals his sound character; 
those others display their flawed ones.  
 
 
 The story of King David’s wife-stealing and husband-murdering is also instructive.  The 
story is well known, but it’s easy to forget the details.   
 God’s favorite, upholder of the Mosaic Code, King David, strolling on the roof of his 
palace, catches a glimpse of Bathsheba.  He likes what he sees so much that he “took 
her. . . and she came to him, and he lay with her.”  For speed, it’s like courtship in 
Arcadia. 
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 It might have been left at that, a one-night stand, but soon Bathsheba informs the King 
that she’s pregnant.  The trouble is that her husband has been off at the war with the 
Ammonites.  To protect her, and himself, David needs to cover up his paternity.  So, he 
has Uriah recalled on leave from the siege of Rabbah certain that the man will sleep with 
his wife.  But the noble Uriah shuns the comfort of his wife and bed while his comrades 
are still in the field.  He’s the opposite of a hypocrite and capable of stoic self-
denial.  David’s next ploy is to get Uriah drunk, thinking that might send him back to 
dally with his wife.  That gambit fails, too. 
 
 
 Desperate now, David sends a confidential dispatch to General Joab ordering him to 
arrange for Uriah to be killed in battle.  Send him to the front, he orders, and when the 
fighting’s hot, pull back and abandon him “so that he may be struck down, and die.” 
 
 
 To accomplish this, Joab has to provoke fighting at the walls of Rabbah and this 
unnecessary act cost more lives than Uriah’s.  Joab might well have been either 
indignant or worried because, when he sends his battle report to David, he bids the 
courier tell the King—in case he’s angered by the number of casualties—that Uriah is 
among the dead.  David’s response is callous.  He replies that Joab shouldn’t worry 
about the matter.  C’est la guerre.  Just take the damned city. 
 
 
 Bathsheba mourns for the prescribed period then marries David. 
 
 
 Even though all this is happening in the Old Testament, and despite all his past dealings 
with the Divine, David appears to overlook that the Deity is going to know who’s been 
naughty or nice.  God does indeed take note but chooses to handle the matter 
indirectly.  He tells the whole story to Nathan, who gets an audience with David but also 
doesn’t directly accuse him.  Instead, he—and God, through him—devises a way for 
David to realize the depth of his hypocrisy.  He does it with a story, telling the king that 
a rich man with large flocks has stolen a poor man’s “one little ewe lamb,” a beloved 
family pet who is “like a daughter to him.”  Polygamous David’s reaction to this 
injustice shows that his principles are in order, but that his character is not.  “As the Lord 
lives,” he bellows, “the man who has done this deserves to die. . .”  
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 Nathan’s reply is to the point and not indirect at all.  “You are the man.”  He might have 
stopped there, but he didn’t.  Nathan, still speaking for God, rehearses all that was done 
for David and asks, “Why have you despised the word of the Lord, to do what is evil in 
his sight?”  The question is rhetorical, of course, and it is followed by a fearful curse and 
the promise of swift punishment, including the rising up of his enemies and the public 
humiliation of David’s many wives copulating with other men “in the sight of the 
sun.  For you did it secretly; but I will do this before all Israel. . .”  There will also be a 
host of new enemies.  To top it off, God condemns Bathsheba’s newborn to death. 
 
 
 Filled with remorse, David prays for the mortally sick infant, lies on the ground, 
fasts.  But when the child dies, David ceases all this.  He resumes his former life, 




 Why did God love him?  Presumably, it’s because David sincerely repented of his 
actions, and learned from the experience.  Is it a case of hypocrisy rewarded?  That 
would be a perverse reading.  I think the implication is that David was transformed by 
events, became a better man, a better ruler, and so deserves to keep his throne.   
 
 
 The next event recorded is that Joab takes the Ammonite capital but calls in David so 
that the king will get credit for the victory.  David dons the Ammonite crown, gathers up 
the spoils, and, in the customary fashion, enslaves the population. 
 
 
 On the matter of public copulations and all the enemies with whom God promised to 
pester David, the Bible is silent.  These things didn’t happen; apparently, the 
punishments were nullified.  So, David winds up with Bathsheba, a better heir than 
Absalom, and, to boot, God’s love.  Should we say that he got away with 
murder?  Charismatic celebrities often do but I don’t think we want to say this of 
David.  Would we call God a hypocrite for not carrying out the terms of the 
sentence?  For reinstating his favor to David?  For allowing him to keep his throne and 
Bathsheba, for giving him a son like Solomon?  Better to say that David was like de 
Wendeval but that he “evolved,” like Lincoln. 
 
 
 Still, one can’t help wondering what Nathan made of it all—or, for that matter, the 
voiceless Bathsheba. 
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•         •         • 
 
-My, my.  Socrates.  The Sheriff of Nottingham.  David and Bathsheba. 
-Yes.  Rather long digressions from—what was it?  Where did we start? 
-With suburbs and steaks.   
-Steaks and suburbs.  Right.  The things we like but think we shouldn’t.  Well, maybe 
we’re all bound to be hypocrites in one thing or another, at one time or another, and 
what’s crucial isn’t to live up to all our values but to have the fortitude to do it when it 
really matters. 
-That’s a rather comforting thought. 
-So is God forgiving David’s indefensible hypocrisy, loving him in spite of it. 
-You think that’s better than justice? 
-I think I’d be a hypocrite if I said otherwise. 
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